Meek and obedient you follow the leader down well-trodden corridors into the valley of steel - Pink Floyd, "Sheep"
This 2004 document used to be posted at the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, but is no longer available. Seemed a good time to find a copy and put it up. This is the unclassified version that leaves out the part about executing all refuseniks. Kidding, of course.
I am not saying this is because of a conspiracy. In fact, it could just be outdated due to executive order and such, or do to classified arrangements that are not a threat. However, I also am not ruling anything out.
According to a retired person from the medical profession, who worked inside government agencies, nurses are servile, and idiotic as a rule. Everyone just mindlessly follows orders. And mishaps happen constantly.
I included a 2002 Department of Defense document below the first reprinted document, as well, which points out the anthrax motivation.
This all started as a result of those anthrax attacks which occurred in the wake of 9/11 which appear, to me, to have been perpetrated by our own government. In fact, Obama's "Executive Order 13527 -- Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack," which calls for armed delivery of vaccines or treatments, specifically mentions anthrax. But then his executive order
"REVISED LIST OF QUARANTINABLE COMMUNICABLE DISEASES" builds his case for ebola on Bush's Executive Order 13295.
|Legit as Shit|
The most potentially disturbing bit to me is: "Development and deployment of safe, effective medical countermeasures against biological weapons agents of concern remains an urgent priority. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services, is working with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to shape and execute an aggressive research program to develop better medical countermeasures. " - LS
Homeland Security Presidential Directive - HSPD-10 Unclassified Version
Biodefense for the 21st Century
Release Date: 04/28/04
Preventing and controlling future biological weapons threats will be even more challenging. Advances in biotechnology and life sciences -- including the spread of expertise to create modified or novel organisms -- present the prospect of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that would require new detection methods, preventive measures, and treatments. These trends increase the risk for surprise. Anticipating such threats through intelligence efforts is made more difficult by the dual-use nature of biological technologies and infrastructure, and the likelihood that adversaries will use denial and deception to conceal their illicit activities. The stakes could not be higher for our Nation.
[W]e conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our biological defense capabilities to identify future priorities and actions to support them. The results of that study provide a blueprint for our future biodefense program, Biodefense for the 21st Century, that fully integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities.
Specific direction to departments and agencies to carry out this biodefense program is contained in a classified version of this directive.
The United States will continue to use all means necessary to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global interests.
The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water .- focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease -- also is being greatly strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive.
A demonstrated military capability to defend against biological weapons and other WMD strengthens our forward military presence in regions vital to United States security, promotes deterrence, and provides reassurance to critical friends and allies.
Despite the inherent challenges of identifying and characterizing biological weapons programs and anticipating biological attacks, we are improving the Intelligence Community.s ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. We are increasing the resources dedicated to these missions and adopting more aggressive approaches for accomplishing them. Among our many initiatives, we are continuing to develop more forward-looking analyses, to include Red Teaming efforts, to understand new scientific trends that may be exploited by our adversaries to develop biological weapons and to help position intelligence collectors ahead of the problem.
Anticipation of Future Threats
The proliferation of biological materials, technologies, and expertise increases the potential for adversaries to design a pathogen to evade our existing medical and non-medical countermeasures. To address this challenge, we are taking advantage of these same technologies to ensure that we can anticipate and prepare for the emergence of this threat. We are building the flexibility and speed to characterize such agents, assess existing defenses, and rapidly develop safe and effective countermeasures.
Preventing biological weapons attacks is by far the most cost-effective approach to biodefense.
To address this challenge, we are further enhancing diplomacy, arms control, law enforcement, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede adversaries seeking biological weapons capabilities.
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in December 2002, places special emphasis on the need for proactive steps to confront WMD threats. Consistent with this approach, we have improved and will further improve our ability to detect and destroy an adversary.s biological weapons assets before they can be used.
Early warning, detection, or recognition of biological weapons attacks to permit a timely response to mitigate their consequences is an essential component of biodefense. Through the President.s recently proposed biosurveillance initiative, the United States is working to develop an integrated and comprehensive attack warning system to rapidly recognize and characterize the dispersal of biological agents in human and animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and the environment.
Deterrence is the historical cornerstone of our defense, and attribution -- the identification of the perpetrator as well as method of attack .- forms the foundation upon which deterrence rests. Biological weapons, however, lend themselves to covert or clandestine attacks that could permit the perpetrator to remain anonymous. We are enhancing our deterrence posture by improving attribution capabilities.
Capabilities required for response and mitigation against biological attacks will be based on interagency-agreed scenarios that are derived from plausible threat assessments.
Moreover, we are working to expand and, where needed, create new Federal, state, and local medical and public health capabilities for all-hazard mass casualty care.
Medical Countermeasure Development
Development and deployment of safe, effective medical countermeasures against biological weapons agents of concern remains an urgent priority. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services, is working with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to shape and execute an aggressive research program to develop better medical countermeasures. NIH.s work increasingly will reflect the potential for novel or genetically engineered biological weapons agents and possible scenarios that require providing broad-spectrum coverage against a range of possible biological threats to prevent illness even after exposure. Additionally, we have begun construction of new labs. We are striving to assure the nation has the infrastructure required to test and evaluate existing, proposed, or promising countermeasures, assess their safety and effectiveness, expedite their development, and ensure rapid licensure.
Francis A. Boyle
504 E. Pennsylvania Ave.
Champaign, IL 61820 USA
(personal comments only)
· U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command – http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/baa01.htm
· U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command –
· Air Force Research Laboratories –
· Naval Surface Warfare Center –
· Marine Corps Systems Command –
· Joint Program Office for Biological Defense –
· Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency –
· Technical Support Working Group –