Meek and obedient you follow the leader down well-trodden corridors into the valley of steel - Pink Floyd, "Sheep"
--
This 2004 document used to be posted at the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, but is no longer available. Seemed a good time to find a copy and put it up. This is the unclassified version that leaves out the part about executing all refuseniks. Kidding, of course.
I am not saying this is because of a conspiracy. In fact, it could just be outdated due to executive order and such, or do to classified arrangements that are not a threat. However, I also am not ruling anything out.
According to a retired person from the medical profession, who worked inside government agencies, nurses are servile, and idiotic as a rule. Everyone just mindlessly follows orders. And mishaps happen constantly.
I included a 2002 Department of Defense document below the first reprinted document, as well, which points out the anthrax motivation.
This all started as a result of those anthrax attacks which occurred in the wake of 9/11 which appear, to me, to have been perpetrated by our own government. In fact, Obama's "Executive Order 13527 -- Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack," which calls for armed delivery of vaccines or treatments, specifically mentions anthrax. But then his executive order
"REVISED LIST OF QUARANTINABLE COMMUNICABLE DISEASES" builds his case for ebola on Bush's Executive Order 13295.
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| Legit as Shit |
The most potentially disturbing bit to me is: "Development and deployment of safe, effective medical countermeasures against biological weapons agents of concern remains an urgent priority. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services, is working with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to shape and execute an aggressive research program to develop better medical countermeasures. " - LS
Homeland Security Presidential
Directive - HSPD-10 Unclassified Version
Biodefense for the 21st
Century
Release Date:
04/28/04
Preventing and controlling future biological weapons threats will be even
more challenging. Advances in biotechnology and life sciences -- including the
spread of expertise to create modified or novel organisms -- present the
prospect of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that would require new
detection methods, preventive measures, and treatments. These trends increase
the risk for surprise. Anticipating such threats through intelligence efforts is
made more difficult by the dual-use nature of biological technologies and
infrastructure, and the likelihood that adversaries will use denial and
deception to conceal their illicit activities. The stakes could not be higher
for our Nation.
[W]e conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our biological defense
capabilities to identify future priorities and actions to support them. The
results of that study provide a blueprint for our future biodefense program,
Biodefense for the 21st Century, that fully integrates the sustained efforts of
the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence,
diplomatic, and law enforcement communities.
Specific direction to departments and agencies to carry out this
biodefense program is contained in a classified version of this
directive.
The United
States will continue to use all means necessary
to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons attacks perpetrated
against our homeland and our global interests.
The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water
.- focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease -- also is
being greatly strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated
future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and
repetitive.
A demonstrated military capability to defend against biological weapons
and other WMD strengthens our forward military presence in regions vital to
United
States security, promotes deterrence, and
provides reassurance to critical friends and allies.
Despite the inherent challenges of identifying and characterizing
biological weapons programs and anticipating biological attacks, we are
improving the Intelligence Community.s ability to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence. We are increasing the resources dedicated to these
missions and adopting more aggressive approaches for accomplishing them. Among
our many initiatives, we are continuing to develop more forward-looking
analyses, to include Red Teaming efforts, to understand new scientific trends
that may be exploited by our adversaries to develop biological weapons and to
help position intelligence collectors ahead of the problem.
Anticipation of Future
Threats
The proliferation
of biological materials, technologies, and expertise increases the potential for
adversaries to design a pathogen to evade our existing medical and non-medical
countermeasures. To address this challenge, we are taking advantage of these
same technologies to ensure that we can anticipate and prepare for the emergence
of this threat. We are building the flexibility and speed to characterize
such agents, assess existing defenses, and rapidly develop safe and effective
countermeasures.
Proactive Prevention
Preventing biological weapons attacks is by far the most cost-effective
approach to biodefense.
To address this challenge, we are further enhancing diplomacy, arms control, law enforcement,
multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede
adversaries seeking biological weapons capabilities.
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in
December 2002, places special emphasis on the need for proactive steps to
confront WMD threats. Consistent with this approach, we have improved and will
further improve our ability to detect and destroy an adversary.s biological
weapons assets before they can be used.
Attack Warning
Early warning, detection, or recognition of biological weapons attacks to
permit a timely response to mitigate their consequences is an essential
component of biodefense. Through the President.s recently proposed
biosurveillance initiative, the
United States is working to develop
an integrated and comprehensive attack warning system to rapidly recognize and
characterize the dispersal of biological agents in human and animal populations,
food, water, agriculture, and the environment.
Attribution
Deterrence is the historical cornerstone of our defense, and attribution
-- the identification of the perpetrator as well as method of attack .- forms
the foundation upon which deterrence rests. Biological weapons, however, lend
themselves to covert or clandestine attacks that could permit the perpetrator to
remain anonymous. We are enhancing our deterrence posture by improving
attribution capabilities.
Capabilities required for response and mitigation against biological
attacks will be based on interagency-agreed scenarios that are derived from
plausible threat assessments.
Moreover, we are working to expand and, where needed,
create new Federal, state, and local medical and public health capabilities for
all-hazard mass casualty care.
Medical Countermeasure Development
Development and deployment of safe, effective medical countermeasures
against biological weapons agents of concern remains an urgent priority. The National Institutes of Health (NIH),
under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services, is working
with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other
agencies to shape and execute an aggressive research program to develop
better medical countermeasures. NIH.s work increasingly will reflect the
potential for novel or genetically engineered biological weapons agents and
possible scenarios that require providing broad-spectrum coverage against a
range of possible biological threats to prevent illness even after exposure.
Additionally, we have begun construction of new labs. We are striving to assure
the nation has the infrastructure required to test and evaluate existing,
proposed, or promising countermeasures, assess their safety and effectiveness,
expedite their development, and ensure rapid licensure.
Francis A. Boyle
Law Building
504 E. Pennsylvania
Ave.
Champaign, IL 61820
USA
217-333-7954
(Voice)
217-244-1478
(Fax)
(personal comments
only)
Statement of
Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar
Deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for
chemical and biological defense
biological terrorism:
Department of Defense research and development
Department of Defense research and development
February 5, 2002
BEFORE THE
SENATE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE
ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE
“Fighting
Bioterrorism: Using America's Scientists and Entrepreneurs to Find Solutions”
107TH
CONGRESS
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman
and distinguished committee members, I am Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense. My office is the single focal
point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for oversight,
coordination, and integration of the Department’s Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. The tragic
events of September 11th and the anthrax cases resulting from the
letters sent to members of Congress and the media have heightened the public’s
awareness of the biological terrorism threat. I was invited to speak to the
committee today about means by which to harness the potential of America’s
scientists and private sector to address bioterrorism. In order to address the
committee’s concerns, I will discuss the extensive efforts underway by the
Department of Defense (DoD) to counter the biological weapons threat, including
highlights of how we are leveraging the capabilities of the private sector
scientific community. In addition, I will discuss some means by which the
scientific community will continue to be integral to developing material
responses to address the biological threat. My testimony today is in three
parts:
First, I will
discuss the processes by which the Department defines requirements and programs
to support the current and future needs of the warfighter;
Second, I will outline
current programs that address the biological threat, including how we are
drawing upon the scientific community; and
Third, I will
outline some current and planned efforts and processes by which the Department
coordinates with the scientific community to ensure that cutting edge
technologies to counter bioterrorist threats are evaluated and incorporated
into the Department’s research, development, and acquisition (RDA) efforts.
Department of
Defense Threat, Requirements, and Programs Process
Following
Desert Storm, there was a need to coordinate chemical and biological defense
efforts among the Armed Services in order to better address lessons learned
from the Gulf War. In 1994, the Department established the Joint Service
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The vision of this program is to
ensure U.S. military personnel are the best equipped and best prepared force in
the world for operating in future battlespaces that may feature chemical or biological
contamination. The events of the past few months have demonstrated that our
concept of future battlespaces is changing from the battlefield to include
greater emphasis on homeland security.
The customer
for the DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program is the warfighter. The
customer, through the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders, identifies
requirements that form the basis of programs for the RDA community. In order to
identify capabilities needed in the far term, the Services prepare a document
entitled “Joint Future Operational Capabilities,” which provides direction to
the science and technology community.
In addition to
warfighter requirements, identification of current and emerging threats by the
Intelligence Community provides a principal means for the definition of program
needs for biological defense. The Defense Intelligence Agency provides
validated biological and chemical threat assessments. These reports assess the
effects of weapons on how we fight, and in turn are used by the warfighter to
generate the requirements to resolve materiel shortcomings. Together,
assessments of operational needs, adversarial threats, and vulnerabilities form
the basis of Mission Needs Statements and Operational Requirement Documents.
The result is that our programs and technologies are driven by validated threat
assessments and user mission requirements, not by technologies.
The Department
of Defense has established a set of requirements for the successful completion
of military operations in chemical and biological environments. We submit an
Annual Report to Congress documenting our progress in meeting these
requirements. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program consists of all DoD
RDA efforts that develop and procure systems designed to provide U.S. Forces
with the ability to operate effectively in the presence of chemical and
biological agents. Joint and Service unique RDA efforts are structured to
support the framework of the three mission areas of chemical and biological
defense: contamination avoidance (detection, identification, warning,
reporting, reconnaissance, and battle management), protection (individual,
collective and medical support), and decontamination. The programs affect all
Joint warfighting capabilities, while providing an integrated system of systems
on the battlefield. It is essential to view all chemical and biological defense
programs as an integrated system, with each mission area important to joint
forces’ survival. Our forces need the full spectrum of defensive equipment to
survive, fight, and win in a contaminated environment. For example, protective
clothing may be of little value if we don’t provide the appropriate detection
and warning systems.
CURRENT DOD RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND
ACQUISITION TO ADDRESS BIOTERRORISM
The process I
described roughly outlines how the Department conducts business during
peacetime. Since September 11th, we have been at war against terrorism of
global reach, and the DoD RDA community has been fully engaged in supporting
both combat operations overseas and homeland defense. I must point out to the
committee that DoD is not charged with lead federal agent responsibilities as
described in the Federal Response Plan for response to incidents of domestic
terrorism. However, because of the Department’s specialized expertise in
chemical and biological defense and many unique research facilities and
capabilities, the Department plays a key role in addressing bioterrorism.
DoD Biological Defense Funding Summary
In Fiscal Year
2002, the budget request for the Department of Defense Chemical and Biological
Defense Program was approximately $856 million, which includes approximately
$507 million for research and development and $348 million for procurement.
Science and technology efforts included approximately $86 million for the
Medical Biological Defense Research Program and approximately $32 million for
biological detection. Some of the remaining budget includes dual purpose
projects (such as decontamination and masks) that provide protection against
both chemical and biological threats. In addition, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) separately requested $140 million for
exploratory research efforts for biological warfare defense.
DoD Biological Defense Selected Project
Description Summary
Following is a
brief summary of key biological defense efforts.
DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
The Department
of Defense has fielded the following detection capabilities:
·
Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) is a
vehicle-mounted biological detection and identification capability. Until
recently, BIDS units were deployed around the Pentagon.
·
Portal Shield is a network sensor system that
provides automated biological point detection capability to protect high value
fixed sites against BW attacks. This system was deployed at the NATO 50th
Anniversary, and Presidential Nomination Convention.
·
Biological Weapons Agent Sampling Kit provides a low
cost, disposable assay ticket which can provide rapid detection using
environmental samples.
·
Joint Biological Point Detection System which would
provide automated point and mobile biodetection, with reduced size, weight, and
power requirements compared to existing systems. The JBPDS is currently fielded at high value military sites.
Research
activities include automation of biological sample preparation, methods for
detection of biological agents in water, and modeling and simulation of agents
to assist in hazard warning.
MEDICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
Today, the
medical treatment for individuals exposed to biological agents requires a
response tailored to each specific threat. A critical capability for effective
treatment includes training to diagnose and treat biological threats through
such courses as “Medical Management of Biological Casualties,” which is
available on the internet at www.biomedtraining.org.
Technology
advances are being pursued in the research, development and manufacturing of
vaccines and pharmaceuticals that prevent the lethal or incapacitating effects
of biological warfare agents. Therapies that improve survival and reduce the
time for recovery have been developed by private industry and tested against
specific biological warfare agent threats by the DoD. These include commercially
available antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and tetracycline.
Rapid portable diagnostics enabling quick medical response for exposed
warfighters are being pursued. Currently fielded diagnostics rely on
immunological response assays. The Joint Biological Agent Identification and
Diagnosis System currently under development is based on the use of polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) technology to provide more rapid and accurate diagnosis.
DoD has been working with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to obtain
approval for therapies and diagnostics that are not yet FDA approved. DoD is
working with FDA and the National Institutes of Health to identify candidate
therapies that could be tested in animal models for select biological agents.
DoD is also working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
Department of Energy National Laboratories in the development of genetic
primers.
DECONTAMINATION
OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
Decontamination
supports post-attack restoration of forces and operations to a near-normal
capability. Decontamination is organized into three categories that reflect
operational urgency: immediate, operational, and thorough decontamination.
Decontamination also entails special considerations for patients, sensitive
equipment, aircraft, fixed sites, and the retrograde of equipment. DoD doctrine
addresses consequence management decontamination operations, which uses
civilian standard operating procedures, including hypochlorite solutions, and
soap and water solutions. Some of the existing systems include the M291 Skin
Decontaminating Kit, the M295 Individual Equipment Decontaminating Kit, and the
sorbent decontaminating system, which is replacing the existing decontaminant
with a non-aqueous and less caustic decontaminant. Development efforts include
the Joint Service Sensitive Equipment Decontamination, for items such as
electronics, and the Joint Service Fixed Site Decontamination System, which
will provide a family of decontaminants and applicators to provide the
capability to decontaminate ports, airfield, and rear-area supply depots.
Currently, military requirements support a combined decontaminant that is
effective against chemical and biological agents.
Leveraging the Private Sector
The efforts
described above highlight key biological defense capabilities that are fielded
or are planned to be fielded in the near-term.
This does not include the numerous research efforts to exploit cutting
edge science and technology advances to ensure continuous improvement in our
protection and response capabilities. Through the Department’s science and
technology efforts, the state-of-the-art in basic and applied research is being
explored. An excellent example of the DoD
leveraging cutting edge science and technology developed by America’s
scientists is the Biological Agent Warning System (BAWS) technology developed
by MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The BAWS
technology integrated into the JBPDS not only improved overall system
performance for biological warfare agent detection, but also significantly
reduced operation and support costs of the most advanced U.S. point biological
detection capability.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Through the
execution of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, the private sector,
academia, and other Federal government agencies are invited to apply their
knowledge and skills to solve warfighter materiel needs. Executing agencies
post Broad Agency Announcements, Requests for Proposals, and Requests for
Quotation in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation to provide a
structure for fair competition of concepts and ideas. Interested parties may
submit their proposals for review and award of contract. These procedures can be
shortened in time of need, but remain the preferred method for the government
to leverage private sector innovation.
The Chemical
Biological Defense Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program is an
effort by the Department to incorporate emerging scientific and technical
capabilities of America’s scientists and private sector. The overall objective of the SBIR program is
to improve the transfer of innovative scientific and technical efforts that, in
our case, will maximize a strong chemical and biological defense posture. Examples of innovative capabilities tapped
by the SBIR program include biological detection technology, modeling and
simulation, contamination avoidance, and individual protection.
The Military
Departments and Defense Agencies retain the responsibility to manage and
execute the various individual projects. Frequent requests are made to review
new technologies and concepts to incorporate into chemical and biological
defense efforts. Solicited proposals may be submitted in response to requests
for proposals (RFPs) or requests for quotations (RFQs) published in Federal
Business Opportunities (known as “FedBizOpps”), the government’s designated
point of entry on the Internet for providing public access to notices of
procurement actions over $25,000.
FedBizOpps may be found at http://www.fedbizopps.gov.
The appropriate
addressee for submitting unsolicited proposals is with the Military Departments
and Defense Agencies. There are several organizations participating in the DoD
management of chemical and biological defense programs to whom unsolicited
proposals might be submitted. Many of these organizations provide information
on the processes for submitting proposals through Broad Agency Announcements
(BAAs) or similar instructions. Following is a partial list of organizations,
and internet addresses, with information on submitting unsolicited proposals.
This information may be updated occasionally, and thus should be checked for
updates.
·
U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command – http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/baa01.htm
In response to the
September 11 attacks, the Department also established a BAA to accept proposals
from all sources on how to respond to the terrorist threats. Thousands of proposals were submitted. Hundreds of these applied to the biological
terrorist threat.
Finally, there
are numerous conferences annually in which the Department’s chemical and
biological defense science and technology needs are presented to academia and
industry organizations, thereby providing yet further opportunities for
scientists and the private sector to become aware of how they can contribute to
America’s chemical and biological defense posture.
CONCLUSION
The anthrax
attacks late last year pointed out the real dangers of biological weapons.
While these attacks have increased the priority of our efforts, the Department
has been drawing upon our nation’s scientific expertise to develop and field an
effective defense capability to protect our forces and nation from adversaries
at home and overseas. Continuing advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology,
and related scientific areas will require our continued vigilance to ensure
that we are prepared for the threat and not caught by technological surprise.
My comments today highlight just some of the numerous scientific efforts the
Department is supporting. I thank you for the opportunity to speak today and
welcome any questions you may have.
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