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| Herschel Vinyard DEP Secretary of Florida "The New World Order will have to be built from the bottom up rather than from the top down...but in the end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece will accomplish much more than the old fashioned frontal assault." CFR member Richard Gardner, writing in the April 1974 issue of the CFR's journal, Foreign Affairs. |
Was Florida DEP Secretary Herschel Vinyard's main qualification that he could help with damage control related to the Deepwater Horizon spill? Vinyard is listed as a lobbyist, officially.
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| source |
There was a lot of effort made to keep Vinyard's past out of discussion when challenges arose relating to it when he was selected as the DEP Secretary for Florida.Objections were originally raised by PEER and the Florida Clean Water Network in 2011.
Vinyard was selected in January 2011, just months after the incident. During the incident he worked with Atlantic Marine, which was bought by foreign BAE Systems less than a month after the Deepwater Horizon incident.
This document sheds (also below) some light on the nature of his past activities. His former company, Atlantic Marine, was involved in tanker operations in the Gulf of Mexico.
Particularly interesting to note: " Atlantic has also entered into a joint venture agreement with Samsung Heavy Industries and Conoco which will give us access to Samsung's large shuttle tanker design and building technology so that we can build shuttle tankers for Conoco and others to operate in the Gulf of Mexico."
Conoco came in as a top bidder after the Deepwater Horizon incident. And, since then, BP and Conoco are partnering in the Gulf of Mexico.
Rick Scott said of Vinyard: "We are fortunate to have recruited Herschel from the private sector into government service".
But he's still listed as a lobbyist?
In the 2002 statement, Vinyard discusses plans for future oil export activities in a collaboration with Samsung and Conocophillips.Conocophillips spent $69 million in federal lobbying from 2008-2012.
According to Polluter Watch: "The Political Economy Research Institute ranks ConocoPhillips number 11 on their list of the 100 worst U.S. polluters, higher than any other energy company. According to the company’s records, 64.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (or CO2 equivalent of more potent greenhouse gases, such as methane) were released in 2008. In 2010, ConocoPhillips was fined $175,000 by the Environmental Protection Agency for violating the Clean Air Act through the release of carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and other chemicals on the Southern Ute Indian Reservation."
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| Conoco Shuttle Design |
Obama, went he set up a National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, placed William K. Reilly, from the board of directors of Conocophillips. Reilly was also Administrator of the EPA under George H. W. Bush.
Herschel Vinyard was, in the past, employed by Atlantic Marine, BAE Systems, and the Shipbuilders Council of America.
With these kinds of connections, was Vinyard selected to help in the Deepwater Horizon cover up? Many questions arose, as did manslaughter charges. A November 30, 2012 article reads: "Prosecutors told a New Orleans court the on-site managers ignored "glaring red flags that the well was not secure" and failed to take "appropriate action" to prevent the blowout."
BP seemed to buy the innocence of the perpetrators for $4 Billion. Hilariously, Eric Holder piped in: "“I hope this sends a clear message to those who would engage in this wanton misconduct that there will be a penalty paid."
If you've got money, no jail for you. That makes all prison debtor's prison. Think about it. Eric Holder obviously did.
Greg Palast also revealed how intelligence agencies work with the oil giant. Greg Palast became ill soon thereafter. Other whistleblowers mysteriously died.
Florida is still receiving and allocating funds from the agreement Obama made, and DEP created a webpage devoted to the good it is doing.
FOAI requests include communications involving Conoco related to the spill. But many were never answered, and information is still being held back. 3 pages were withheld from released communications. One section reads: "Engineers from Chevron, Shell, Conoco, Exxon, and Livermore Lab met with BP engineers regarding ranging technology to intercept the DEEPWATER HORIZON/Mississippi Canyon Block 252 well. This same group will meet with BP for a "well kill" review."
Since then, BP and Conoco have announced new oil discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico. And here.
BP and Conoco clearly work closely together, as did Vinyard and Conoco.
STATEMENT
OF
HERSCHEL T. VINYARD, JR.
BEFORE
THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON MERCHANT MARINE
JULY 23, 2002
Good
Morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing and for your interest in the
wellbeing of the U.S. shipyard industry. My name is Herschel Vinyard, and I am
Vice President of Atlantic Marine Holding
Company. Atlantic Marine is a privately held
company that owns and operates shipbuilding
and ship repair facilities in Jacksonville,
Florida and Mobile, Alabama where we employ
approximately 2,000 workers. Atlantic Marine in Jacksonville builds
small and mid-sized state-of-the-art vessels
and provides high quality commercial and Navy
vessel repair. Our Alabama facilities build medium and
large commercial ships and barges and as well
as repair bluewater commercial vessels, cruise
ships and vessels that service the offshore
energy industry.
Mr.
Chairman, I am proud of the story that
Atlantic Marine has to tell. Since the company was founded in 1964,
we have built a reputation throughout the
world for high quality workmanship, commitment
to excellence and for our ability to deliver
vessels on time. Atlantic Marine is currently building
large 150,000-barrel articulated tug/barge
units (ATBs) and is marketing even larger
units with a capacity of approximately 250,000
barrels. Atlantic has also entered into a joint
venture agreement with Samsung Heavy
Industries and Conoco which will give us
access to Samsung's large shuttle tanker
design and building technology so that we can
build shuttle tankers for Conoco and others to
operate in the Gulf of Mexico. We plan to use the experience we've
gained from building very large tank barges
and the expertise obtained through the Samsung
joint venture to enter the large commercial
shipbuilding market.
Atlantic
Marine is not alone. There is a highly competitive
shipbuilding industry in the U.S. today
building small and mid-sized vessels such as
workboats, barges, vessels that service the
offshore energy industry, ferries and small
cruise ships for commercial and government
markets. The small to mid-sized shipyards are
aggressive, eager and look forward to the
opportunity to tackle larger projects.
Unfortunately,
the state of the industry with regard
to large
commercial ship construction in the
U.S. is not as bright. Since the United States unilaterally
eliminated the Construction
Differential
Subsidy (CDS) program in 1981, we have
seen
America's share of the international
shipbuilding market drop from 9.5
percent to
less than 0.5 percent today. At the
same time, America watched the
Asian countries increase their
subsidization
rates and capture 83 percent of the
international market share. European
countries continue to
subsidize their shipyards, but at
rates lower
than Asian countries. The European
market
share has plummeted from approximately
30
percent to less than 15 percent today.
U.S.
shipyards have built only a handful of large
self-propelled commercial vessels in the last
twenty years, while shipyards in Korea, Japan
and now China have built hundreds of large
vessels. The result of this restructuring of the
international marketplace has been the loss of
our competitive edge in building large
commercial vessels. Unless policies are enacted quickly to
encourage a revitalization of large commercial
shipbuilding and ship repair in the United
States, America risks losing this capability
forever. This loss would have dire consequences
on our national security and on our ability to
rebuild our aging domestic fleet at a time in
our history when national security is an
increasingly critical issue.
Ten
or more U.S. shipyard facilities that were
building large commercial ships in 1981 have
closed their doors since the CDS program was
eliminated. Total shipyard employment in the U.S.
has dropped from 187,000 workers in 1981 to
91,000 workers last year. Today, there are 25 U.S. shipyards that
have the facilities to build vessels greater
than 400 feet in length. Of these 25 facilities, only six of
them have recent experience in building
commercial vessels of that size.
The
large commercial ship repair industry in the
U.S. is also in serious jeopardy. The U.S. reduced its Navy maintenance
budgets and implemented government policies
that discourage domestic repair. As a result, commercial ship repair
jobs are moving overseas to heavily subsidized
foreign shipyards that benefit from less
stringent regulatory regimes, favorable
exchange rates and cheap labor, which will
force additional U.S. shipyards out of
business. The situation is critical to our
national security. America's entire commercial and naval
ship repair base was needed to activate the
ships in the Ready Reserve Fleet when the U.S.
undertook Operation Desert Storm in 1991. We question whether we could meet a
similar need today as America's ship repair
capacity has been reduced significantly since
1991.
It
will not be easy to revitalize the large
commercial vessel construction and repair
industry in the U.S. America must overcome 20 years of
foreign shipyard subsidization and the
construction experience that subsidization
provided these shipyards. A 20 to 30-year commitment to
shipbuilding by the governments of Korea and
Japan have produced outstanding shipbuilding
companies that serve an important segment of
the world economy. In contrast, America scrambles from
year to year to barely keep alive a program
such as the Title XI loan guarantee program.
American
shipyards also face, in most instances, much
more stringent safety and environmental
regulations than our foreign competitors. We are not opposed to sound safety and
environmental regulations, but we must
recognize that there are costs to implement
and comply with those regulations that, in the
global competitive picture, others don't
face. Added
to those challenges is the fact that our
natural customer base - U.S.-flag operators
- is declining in terms of numbers of
operators and vessels due to the tax and labor
cost advantages enjoyed by their foreign flag
competition. U.S.-flag vessels now make up less than
two percent of the overall world fleet, the
lowest percentage in over a century.
Mr.
Chairman, we believe that failure to enact
long-term policies to encourage domestic
commercial shipbuilding and repair in U.S.
yards will lead to further shipyard closings
and jeopardize our nation's ability to
respond to national emergencies. The challenges are difficult, but they
can be overcome by enacting realistic
government policies that promote all segments
of the maritime industry. We have several specific, cost-effective changes to
government policies that should encourage the
revitalization of the shipyard industry.
1.
Maritime Security Program (MSP). Under the MSP, the Government contracts
with owners of U.S.-flag commercial ships for
service when needed for national emergencies
or war. This
program ensures that sufficient cargo carrying
capacity is available to the U.S. Government
by contracting with commercial ship operators
for this service without having to fund the
construction of a fleet of Government-owned
vessels. The program serves a vital national
security requirement, and we fully support its
reauthorization. Nevertheless, the program does nothing
to help maintain a healthy shipbuilding and
repair industrial base - a
national security requirement just as
important as maintaining sufficient U.S.-flag
vessels and merchant mariners. We propose that the reauthorization of
the MSP require that all non-emergency
maintenance and repair on MSP ships be
performed in U.S. yards and that contract
payments to MSP operators be modified to meet
the additional cost, if any, associated with
the domestic repair requirement.
2.
Title XI Shipbuilding Loan Guarantee
Program. The Title XI program, originally
established in the Merchant Marine Act of
1936, and revitalized in 1993 under the
National Shipbuilding Initiative provides
government loan guarantees for vessel
construction projects at terms more favorable
than private lending institutions are able to
offer without the guarantee. Financing is the critical variable the
shipyard cannot, no matter how progressive,
influence or control. Loan guarantees are offered for vessels
built in U.S. yards for domestic use or for
export. This program enables operators to extend their amortization
schedule for up to 25 years, thereby reducing
annual operating costs. Title XI loan guarantees have financed
over $5 billion in vessel construction
projects since 1993; however, recent problems
caused in large part by the devastating
economic impact on the travel industry by the
September 11 attacks and the isolated
opposition to funding for the program has
jeopardized its future. This program can do
much to help U.S.-flag operators to build
vessels in U.S. yards; however, the program
will never be fully successful until operators
can rely on a steady stream of funding to
ensure that funds for loan guarantees will be
available when their shipbuilding projects
mature and until the program is administered
in a way that is consistent with procedures
and policies used by commercial lending
institutions.
3.
Cargo Preference Program. Cargo Preference laws require that all
or a portion of all government impelled cargo
moving in international trade be transported
on U.S.-flag vessels. U.S. cargo preference laws are similar
to those of other countries and were
implemented to help ensure that sufficient
U.S.-flag sealift capacity and merchant
mariners to operate them are available during
times of crisis. Certainly, this program is vital to our
national security but, like the current MSP,
it does nothing to help maintain the shipyard
industrial base. This could be easily modified by
requiring that vessels built and/or repaired
in the U.S. be given priority status when
cargo preference contracts are awarded.
4.
Capital Construction Fund (CCF). CCF was established to assist owners
and operators of U.S.-flag vessels to
accumulate the capital necessary to expand the
U.S.-built, U.S.-flag fleet. Currently, only operators of U.S.-flag vessels in the
international, Great Lakes and non-contiguous
trades can deposit a percentage of a
vessel's revenue into a tax deferred account
for this purpose. CCF deposits on hand are estimated at
$1.4 billion. The idea behind the CCF is sound;
however, since the CCF was introduced, no new
U.S.-flag vessels in the international trades
have been built in the U.S. Congress can, with no government
spending, extend eligibility for participation
in the CCF to the construction of vessels to
be operated in the domestic coastwise trade. This change would greatly enhance
America's ability to add vessels to the
U.S.-flag fleet and create alternatives to
overcrowded rail and highway systems and jump
start the lagging petroleum fleet replacement
program mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990. In
addition, CCF should be changed to allow CCF
deposits to pay for vessel repairs in U.S.
yards. This
modification would also add no additional cost
to the Government and help maintain our ship
repair industrial base.
5.
Military Sealift Command (MSC). The MSC operates a fleet of container,
fast sealift, breakbulk and heavy sealift
ships used to supply the Armed Services all
over the globe. MSC operates 68 active sealift ships,
34 of which were built in foreign shipyards. Moreover, much of the maintenance and
repair on those vessels is performed in
foreign shipyards that do not have to meet the
same quality standards imposed by the U.S.
Government on domestic shipyards. Modification of current MSC contracting
procedures would provide additional repair
opportunities for U.S. ship repair yards and
encourage construction of MSC ships in U.S.
yards. For
example, MSC has awarded to operators with
foreign-built ships, short-term contracts with
options to extend the contract term. These short-term contracts preclude the
possibility of an operator from getting the
financing to build in the U.S. a new ship, as
lending institutions will not finance new
vessel construction without long-term
operating contracts. MSC can provide vessel operators with a
guaranteed steady stream of income needed to
obtain the necessary ship construction
financing by awarding long-term operating
contracts.
Mr.
Chairman, the suggestions above are modest in
scope. I am not here this morning asking for government
subsidization of the commercial shipyard
industry. I am asking only that Government
policies recognize that a healthy commercial
shipyard industry is an important element of
both our economy and national security, and
that maritime policies be conceived with all
segments of the maritime industry in mind. Short term, piecemeal policies that
benefit one segment or another of the maritime
industry have proved insufficient to
revitalize our blue water, oceangoing industry
engaged in the international marketplace. A long-term maritime commitment by the
United States is needed to enable the private
sector to develop the human capital and
physical infrastructure necessary to serve the
interests of this great nation.
We
are quickly reaching a critical stage. The remaining U.S.-built vessels in our
international fleet are approaching the end of
their useful lives and the size of that fleet
is shrinking every year. The only way to reverse this trend is
to enact policies that enable and encourage
newly constructed U.S.-flag vessels to compete
in the international marketplace and replace
aging vessels, including the single hull tank
vessel fleet, in our domestic trades. Certainly, the Maritime Security
Program should be a cornerstone of those
policies, but MSP alone will not ensure the
future of the U.S. maritime industry. Policies that enable American shipyards
to reenter the large commercial shipbuilding
market and maintain our capacity to repair
large commercial and Navy ships are also
important.
In
closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my
appreciation to you and your staff for your
unwavering support for the domestic shipyard
industry and the maritime industry in general
and to express my commitment to work with
Congress, the Administration, vessel operators
and maritime labor to enact realistic and
comprehensive maritime policy aimed at
promoting all segments of the industry.
I
will be happy to answer any questions.
|
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
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